UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

1-23-2014

State v. Johnson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41168

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Johnson Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41168" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4370.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4370

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
DOCKET NO. 41168
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2012-17976

v.
DARRICK DONAHUE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
In and For the County of Kootenai

The Honorable Fred M. Gibler, District Judge, Presiding

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
Paul R. Panther
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
PO Box 83720
Boise, 10 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
Attorneys for the Appellant

Malcolm Dymkoski
Attorney at Law
1110 W. Park Place Suite 210
Coeur d'Alene, 1083814
Tel: (208) 765-6077
Fax: (208) 664-6089
Email: maldymkoski@gmail.com
Idaho State Bar No. 3014
Attorney for the Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................
Nature of the Case .................................................
Course of the Proceedings ...........................................
Statement of Facts ................................................

4
4
4
5

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ........................... 7
ARGUMENT ........................................................... 8
1. As Edge Performance, Inc. was given unconditional ownership of the funds,
and as the State concedes that the receipt of those funds by Edge
Performance was authorized, Mr. Johnson cannot be guilty of exercising
unauthorized control over those funds. . ......................... 8
2. If the District Court's Judgment of Acquittal is reversed and remanded,
double jeopardy protection does not bar the District Court from
reinstating the Jury's guilty verdict and sentencing the Defendant... 20
3. Mr. Johnson could not be convicted of theft from Beaudry Motor Sport,
where the funds were from Beaudry Motor, Inc., and then became the
property of Edge Performance, Inc ............................. 21
4. Mr. Johnson cannot be found guilty for non-performance of a contractual
obligation, because the Idaho Constitution forbids imprisonment for
debt ....................................................... 22
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 23

1

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

Cases

Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100, 936 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App.,
1997) ....................................................................... 8
Phillips v. District Court of the Fifth Judicial Dist., 95 Idaho 404, 509 P.2d 1325
(1973) ..................................................................... 22
State v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 748, 735 P.2d 1059 (Ct. App. 1987) ................. 10
State v. Carmouche, - Idaho -, -P.3d - ,2013 WL 6153145 (Ct. App. 2013)
............................................................................ 20
State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322, 193 P.3d 869 (Ct. App. 2008) ............. 15, 16,22
State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 945 P.2d 864 (Ct. App. 1997) .............. 13,16
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 99 P.32 1069 (2004) .............................. 8
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010) ........................ 9

Statutes
I.C. §18-2403(1) ..................................................... 9,22
I.C. §18-2403(2) .................................................. 9, 10, 17
I.C. §18-2403(3) ........................................... 10, 13, 14, 16,23
I.C. §28-1-20I(21) ...................................................... 13
I.C. §28-3-104(l) ....................................................... 12
2

I.C. §28-3-104(3) ....................................................... 12
I.C. §28-3-104(6) ....................................................... 11
I.C. §28-3-105(1) ....................................................... 12
I.C. §28-3-106(1) ....................................................... 12
I.C. §28-3-108(l) ....................................................... 12
I.C. §28-3-110(1) ....................................................... 13
I.C. §28-3-301 ......................................................... 13

Rules
I.C.R. 29(c) ............................................................ 8
Rule 1.15, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct .............................. 10

Other Authorities
Article I, section 15 of the Idaho Constitution ............................ 22, 24

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State has appealed from the Judgment of Acquittal entered by the District
Court on May 14, 2013.

Course of the Proceedings
The Defendant, Derrick Johnson, was charged with Grand Theft by
Unauthorized Control, I.C. §§18-2403(3) and 2407(1)(b), by "knowingly tak[ing]
unauthorized control of funds worth over $1000.00 (One Thousand Dollars), the
property of Beaudry Motor Sports, to wit: $55,256.00 (Fifty-Five Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty-Six Dollars), with the intent to deprive another of property or
appropriate to himself certain property of another .... " R., pp. 30-31. The State
subsequently admitted that "[o]bviously, the control of [Mr. Johnson] of the check on
October 8,2011 was authorized." R., p. 107, L. 5.
The trial was commenced on March 26,2013. Tr., p.8. At the close of the
State's evidence, Mr. Johnson requested entry of a judgment of acquittal. Tr., p.65, L.
24 to p. 66., L. 11. The District Court granted the Motion. Tr., p. 79, L. 2. The
District Court then reversed itself and denied the Motion. Tr., p. 97, L. 8. The trial
4

was then resumed and the jury found Mr. Johnson guilty of grand theft by
unauthorized control. Tr., p. 256, L. 21 - 24.
Mr. Johnson timely filed his Motion for Entry of Judgment of Acquittal on
April 9, 2013. R., pp. 94-95. The District Court entered its Judgment of Acquittal on
May 14,2013. The State filed its Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2013.

Statement of Facts
The evidence produced at trial was unequivocal that Steve Beaudry wrote a
check drawn on the Beaudry Motor, Inc. checking account at Mountain West Bank, in
the amount of $55,256.00, made payable to Edge Performance, Inc., an Idaho
corporation. Tr., p. 8, L. 17-25; Exhibit 3, p. 134; Tr., p. 23, L. 6-9. Edge Performance
was a Kawasaki motorcycle dealer. Tr., p. 139, L. 1, to p. 140, L. 18. Beaudry Motor,
Inc. was ordering four Kawasaki Concours motorcycles from Edge Performance and,
in turn, Edge Performance would have to order those motorcycles from Kawasaki.
Tr., p. 21. L. 6-23. Mr. Johnson was the president and sole shareholder of Edge
Performance, Inc. Tr., p. 138, L. 21 to p. 139, L. 14. Mr. Johnson deposited the check
into the Edge Performance checking account at Bank of Coeur d'Alene on October 8,
2011. Exhibit 1, p. 28 (Deposit slip located at the bottom of the left column, dated
10/8/11). The check did not clear until October 11,2011. Exhibit 1, p. 22 (Entry for

5

10/11/2011, a deposit of $59,748.44). The four motorcycles were not provided to
Beaudry Motor Sports, nor was $55,256.00 paid to Beaudry Motor Sports by Edge
Performance. Tr., p. 35, L. 18 to p. 37, L. 13. In granting the Motion for Entry of

Judgment of Acquittal, the District Court held:
The statute involved in our case required the State to prove that the
defendant exercised unauthorized control over or made an unauthorized
transfer of an interest in the property of another person with the intent
of depriving the owner thereof. As was the situation in Henninger and
Bennett, once the victim here gave the money to the defendant, the
victim parted with his interest in the money. At that point the victim
was no longer the owner of the money. When the defendant breached
the agreement by failing to deliver the motorcycles, the victim had the
right to sue for specific performance or damages. However, because he
did not retain an interest in the money, I've come to the conclusion that
there was no violation of Idaho Code Section 18-2403 subsection 3.

Tr., p. 270, L. 3-17.

6

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Mr. Johnson could not be convicted of theft from Beaudry Motor Sport, where the
funds were from Beaudry Motor, Inc., and then became the property of Edge
Performance, Inc.
2. Mr. Johnson cannot be found guilty for non-performance of a contractual
obligation, because the Idaho Constitution forbids imprisonment for debt.
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ARGUMENT
1. As Edge Performance, Inc. was given unconditional ownership of the

funds, and as the State concedes that the receipt of those funds by Edge
Performance was authorized, Mr. Johnson cannot be guilty of exercising
unauthorized control over those funds.

"The proper description of the standard of review for a motion for judgment of
acquittal under I.C.R. 29(c) is whether there was substantial evidence upon which a
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.32 1069, 1074 (2004).
Mr. Johnson was charged with violation of I.C. §18-2403(3), grand theft by
unauthorized control. The Information charged that Mr. Johnson
on or about October, 2011, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did
knowingly take unauthorized control of funds worth over $1,000.00
(One thousand dollars), the property of Beaudry Motor Sport, to wit:
$55,256.00 (Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred fifty-Six Dollars), with
the intent to deprive another of property or appropriate to himself
certain property of another.

"Clearly, the language of [I.C. §18-2403(3)] corresponds to the tort of
conversion in Idaho civil law, which tort has been defined as dominion over chattels
by a person not the owner, in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner.
[Citations omitted.]" Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100,
104,936 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Ct. App., 1997). The elements of conversion are "(1) that
8

the charged party wrongfully gained dominion of property; (2) that property is owned
or possessed by plaintiff at the time of possession; and (3) the property in question is
personal property." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642,662
(2010). Mr. Johnson was not charged with wrongfully taking, obtaining, or
withholding property from the owner, I.C. §18-2403(1), or obtaining property by trick,
deception, embezzlement, by false pretenses or false promise, I.C. §18-2403(2). He
was only charged with knowingly taking or exercising unauthorized control over a
check for $55,256.00.
The State argues that a bailment was created, such that Mr. Johnson
was a bailee of funds belonging to Beaudry Motor Inc. That argument is in error.
Beaudry Motor Inc. did not own those funds, represented by the check, once it gave
the check to Edge Performance. There was no requirement that the check be
deposited into a trust fund, by which the funds would be deemed to still be owned by
Beaudry Motor Inc. All elements of ownership of those funds by Beaudry Motor Inc.
were given to Edge Performance. It is axiomatic that Edge Performance could not be
a bailee of funds that it owned.
The State argues that Mr. Johnson held those funds in trust, similar an
attorney holding funds in trust for a client. Brief of Appellant, p. 10. However, an
attorney is required to hold client funds in a trust account, where those funds are still
9

deemed to belong to the client. Rule 1.15, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Once
a check is made payable to a payee, and is given to that payee, it becomes the property
of the payee. The requirement that those funds be deposited into a trust account
makes clear that the presentation of a check to a payee, and the subsequent
negotiation of that check, does not make the payee the owner of those funds. There
was no such requirement for Mr. Johnson.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Edge Performance could be deemed a bailee
of the funds, I.C. §18-2403(3) still does not apply. The alleged misappropriation of
property to which one is entrusted is a form of embezzlement. However, Mr. Johnson
was not charged with embezzlement.
Former I. C. § 18-2407 covered one type of embezzlement now treated as
a form of theft. The Statute provided:
Every person entrusted with any property as bailee, tenant, or lodger, or
with any power of attorney for the sale or transfer, who fraudulently
converts the same or the proceeds thereof to his own use, or secretes it
to them with a fraudulent intent to convert to his own use, is guilty of
embezzlement.

State v. Caldwell, 112 Idaho 748, 735 P.2d 1059, Note 2 (Ct. App. 1987). The present
I.C. §18- 2403(2) states that theft includes property taken "(b) By conduct heretofore
defined or known as ... embezzlement .... " In this matter, Mr. Johnson was charged
with violating I.C. §18-2403(3), not I.C. §18-2403(2).
10

Neither Mr. Johnson nor Edge Performance were bailees, and could not have
committed embezzlement. When Edge Performance received the check on October 8,
2011, it received unconditional ownership of the funds. The parties (Edge
Performance and Beaudry Motor, Inc.) entered a unilateral contract wherein Beaudry
Motor Inc. stated that it would give Edge Performance $55,256 if Edge Performance
promised to provide four motorcycles for Beaudry Motor, Inc. Edge Performance
promised to provide the motorcycles, and Beaudry Motor Sports gave Edge
Performance the funds, in the form of a check. Edge Performance became the owner
of the funds at that instant. The check for the funds was an unconditional promise
to pay those funds to Edge Performance. Edge Performance had the absolute right
to negotiate that check, which it did when it was deposited into its bank account. The
bank then became a holder in due course, which it could not have been had the check
been a conditional promise to pay those funds.
Beaudry Motor Sports gave Edge Performance a check in the amount of $55,
256.00, payable "to the order of Edge Performance", and drawn upon the account of
Beaudry Motor, Inc. at Mountain West Bank. '''Check' means (I) a draft, other than
a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank .... " I.C. §28-3-104(6).
"An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (1) of this section, except
paragraph (a), and otherwise falls within the definition of 'check' in subsection (6) of
11

this section is a negotiable instrument and a check." I.e. §28-3-104(3).
Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, 'negotiable
instrument' means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed
amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in
the promise or order, if it: (a) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time
it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (b) Is payable on
demand or at a definite time; and (c) does not state any other
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment
to do any act in addition to the payment of money .... "
(Emphasis added.) I.e. §28-3-104(l).

Except as provided in this section, for the purposes of section 28-3104(1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states (I) an express
condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or order is subject to or
governed by another writing, or (iii) that rights or obligations with
respect to the promise or order are stated in another writing. A
reference to another writing does not of itself make the promise or order
conditional.

I.e. §28-3-106(1). "A promise or order is 'payable on demand' if it .... ii) does not state
any time of payment." I.e. §28-3-108(1).
'''Issue' means the first delivery of an instrument by the maker or drawer,
whether to a holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument
to any person." I.e. §28-3-105(1). "The person to whom an instrument is initially
payable is determined by the intent of the person, whether or not authorized signing
as, or in the name on behalf of, the issuer of the instrument. The instrument is
12

payable to the person intended by the signer .... " I.C. §28-3-110(1).
The exercise of control by Edge Performance over the check for $55,256.00 was
authorized by Beaudry Motor, Inc. The check was an unconditional promise to pay
$55,256.00 to the order of Edge Performance, was payable on demand, and was issued
when it was first delivered to Edge Performance on October 8,2011, thereby giving
rights on that check to Edge Performance, including the right to enforce the check.
'''Person entitled to enforce' an instrument means (1) the holder of the instrument
.... " I.C. §28-3-301. "'Holder' means: (A) The person in possession of a negotiable
instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the
person in possession .... " I.C. §28-1-201(21). That check was then properly
negotiated by Edge Performance, Inc. to the order of Bank CDA (Coeur d'Alene).
Exhibit 3, p. 134.
The State argues that embezzlement by theft of bailed property violates I.C.
§18-2405(3). That argument is incorrect. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that, in
determining that the Defendant has violated I.C. §18-2403(3), it must be found that
the Defendant's possession of the property "constituted 'unauthorized control' of
property of which he was not the 'owner' .... " State v. Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 640,
945 P.2d 864,866 (Ct. App. 1997). In Henninger, the Defendant purchased a truck
from a motor vehicle dealer by executing a secured installment contract, and by
l3

executing a promissory note for the down payment, payable the next day. The
Defendant failed to payoff the promissory note. The dealership then discovered that
the Defendant did not live at the residence address that he had given the dealership,
he did not continue his employment as of the date that he purchased the truck, and
his parents, who he had advised the dealership would provide the funds to pay the
note given for the down payment, did not live at the Nevada address, and did not have
the telephone number, that the Defendant had provided the dealership.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the Defendant was authorized to
exercise control when he took possession of the truck, as the installment sale contract
stated that the Defendant was purchasing the truck, and the dealership executed and
delivered to the Defendant all of the documents necessary to transfer title. It did not
matter that the Defendant lied about his ability to pay the down payment, or about
his ability to pay the installment contract, or about the location of the truck which
secured the installment contract. The only thing that was crucial was that the
Defendant had the authority to take possession and ownership of the truck, even
though the Defendant used fraudulent means to obtain that authority. If even a
fraudulently induced transfer of ownership or control of property cannot constitute a
violation of I.C. §2403(3), then the subsequent failure to pay the debt created by that
transfer of ownership or control cannot constitute a violation of I.C. §2403(3).
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In a later case,State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322, 326, 193 P.3d 869, 873 (Ct.
App. 2008), the Defendant was charged with burglary, which required proof of entry
with the intent to commit a theft. She broke into an animal shelter at night in order
to recover her dog, without paying for the fees that the animal shelter charged for
caring for the dog. The Court of Appeals first found that a theft, as defined in I.C.
§18-2403(l), could not include the Defendant's recovery of her own dog. Nor could it
be deemed theft of the services performed by the animal shelter, as the Defendant
neither knew of, nor requested, those services. The only issue then, was whether the
theft consisted of the Defendant's avoidance of payment of the fees for those services
provided by the animal shelter. Citing Henninger, but still referring to the term
"theft" as used in I.C. §18-2403(1), the Court of Appeals held that
In the present case, we likewise conclude that the legislature did not
intend [I.C. § 18-2403(1)J to criminalize the nonpayment of an existing,
lawfully incurred financial obligation. The words of [I.C. §18-2403(I)J
evince a legislative intent to prohibit active steps to wrongfully acquire
something of value from another, not passive nonpayment of an
obligation that one already owes. It is the trickery, deception, extortion
or similar mischief used to induce the victim to provide something of
value to the perpetrator that [I.C. §18-2403(1)J proscribes, not the mere
dishonoring of an obligation that was innocently created. Moreover, if
[I.C. §18-2403(1)J were interpreted to include mere nonpayment of debt,
it would likely run afoul of Article I, section 15 of the Idaho
Constitution, which specifies that "[tJhere shall be no imprisonment for
debt in this state except in cases of fraud.

(Emphasis added). State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho at 326,193 P.3d at 873.
15

The holdings in Henninger and in Culbreth both indicate that the
determination of whether Mr. Johnson exercised unauthorized possession or control
over the check must be made at the time that the possession or control is initiated.
That possession or control was authorized by Beaudry Motor, Inc. upon delivery of
the check to Edge Performance and, at that same instant, Edge Performance became
the absolute owner of the check. There certainly is an argument that there is a
breach of contract, or that a debt is owed by Edge Performance to Beaudry Motor,
Inc. However, a breach of contract or debt owing is a civil matter, not a criminal
matter. And, as quoted in Culbreth, above, a criminal enforcement of a debt violates
that protections afforded by the Idaho Constitution.
Even if it could be claimed that the jury had sufficient evidence to find that
Mr. Johnson obtained possession of the check by fraud or false promise, that does not
support the conviction. As fraudulently induced transfer of ownership or control does
not violate I.C. §18-2403(3), and "theft" does not include mere nonpayment of debt,
then the only issue in the instant case is whether Mr. Johnson had unauthorized
control of the funds. Edge Performance had the full authority to possess the check, in
the same manner that the Defendant, in Henninger, had the full authority to possess
the truck.
The State attempted to prove Mr. Johnson's guilt by presenting testimony that
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Edge Performance did not place an order with Kawasaki for the four motorcycles.
That testimony was solely produced by leading questions propounded to Mr. Johnson
upon cross-examination by the State, to which Mr. Johnson did not admit. Tr., p.
208, L. 24-25. The theory of that evidence was that Derrick Johnson exercised
unauthorized control over the funds by failing to order the motorcycles from
Kawasaki. That theory is incorrect because, at most, that testimony could only show
that the Defendant received that check from Beaudry Motor Sports under false
promise, I.C. §18-2403(2)(d).

But, the Defendant was not charged with that crime.

Even if that theory has merit, the evidence does not support the theory. The
State had, in its case in chief, produced its Exhibit 2 (p. 107), which are the records
produced by Kawasaki Motors. In Exhibit 2, p. 107, the letter from Kawasaki to the
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, it states that "[Kawasaki] has
diligently searched its records for any and all information relating to Kawasaki
Concours motorcycles sold by KMC to edge Performance, Inc." (Emphasis added). In
Exhibit 2, p. 108, at paragraph 3, it states that "Prosecuting Attorney Arthur
Verharen agreed to limit the scope of the subject Subpoena Duces Tecum to ALL
EVIDENCE RELATED TO CONCOURS MOTORCYCLE SALES BY KAWASAKI
MOTORS CORP., U.S.A. TO EDGE PERFORMANCE, INC." (Emphasis added). It
does not purport to show motorcycles ordered from Kawasaki by Edge Performance.
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Although this Court must draw all inferences in favor of the State in determining
whether the judgment of acquittal was proper, the State cannot create its own
reasonable doubt with evidence it produces, and then ask the Court to ignore the
doubt that it has created.
Conversely, the State also tried to assert that, in fact, Edge Performance
ordered at least two of the motorcycles but diverted them elsewhere. This evidence
could not be used to show that Edge Performance exercised unauthorized control
over Beaudry Motor Inc.'s motorcycles, as the criminal charge against Mr. Johnson
alleged that the Defendant exercised unauthorized possession or control over the
funds, not the motorcycles. Presumably, the State's theory is that Mr. Johnson
exercised unauthorized control over Beaudry Motor Inc.' s funds by purchasing
motorcycles for other customers with those funds.
Linda Holzer testified on behalf of the State that, when she met with Mr.
Johnson in January, 2012, to discuss purchasing the Edge Performance Kawasaki
dealership, Mr. Johnson pointed to a Kawasaki Concours on the showroom floor and
stated that it was Mr. Beaudry's motorcycle. Tr., p. 52, L. 22-24. Mr. Johnson testified
that he did have a Concours motorcycle on the showroom floor at that time, pursuant
to a one year flooring arrangement with the manufacturer. Tr., p. 178, L. 21 to p. 183
L. 16. The State's Exhibit 2, at page 111, shows that Edge Performance purchased a
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Concourse motorcycle on November 11, 2011, and that it was paid for (the balance
was reduced to $0.00) on October 11, 2012, eleven months later, and exactly one year
after Bank CDA credited Edge Performance's checking account with the check from
Beaudry Motor Sports. State's Exhibit 2, p. 131, entitled Invoice, dated 11/11/11,
shows a motorcycle purchased under the Flooring program with a payment date of
January,2013. That same page shows a VIN of JKBZGNC17CA015359 (located on
the second line of the second column, entitled "Description"). That is the same VIN
as shown on Exhibit 2, p. 111, and is the same VIN testified to by Mr. Johnson. Tr.,
p. 180, L. 3-21.
The State also produced testimony from Brett Lancaster, the purchasing agent
for Spokane County, Washington, that Edge Performance had sold a Kawasaki
Concours motorcycle to Spokane County. Tr., p. 61, L. 14-20. He testified that the
purchase order for that motorcycle was not issued by Spokane County until
November 29,2011. Tr., p. 62, L. 8-10. Mr. Johnson testified that Edge Performance
received that motorcycle from Kawasaki with 90-days free flooring. Tr., p. 186, L. 716. The invoice for that motorcycle is also contained in Exhibit 2, p. 130. The
payment for that motorcycle is shown in Exhibit P, on page 174. The payment on
02/22/2012 was for $13,814.00, the same amount as on the Invoice referred to above.
The records produced by Kawasaki Motors, Exhibit 2 (commencing at p. 107),
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show that only two Concours motorcycles were sold by Kawasaki to Edge
Performance. Those documents only contain two VINs, JKBZGNC17CA015359,
which was the motorcycle located in the Edge Performance showroom, and
JKBZGNC17CA015409, which was the motorcycle sold to Spokane County. Even if
the State could argue that Mr. Johnson's guilt could be proven by showing that he
used the funds provided by Beaudry Motor, Inc. to purchase motorcycles that were
diverted to other customers, the State has only produced credible evidence to show
that Edge Performance purchase two Concours motorcycles, neither purchase being
made with those funds.

2. If the District Court's Judgment of Acquittal is reversed and
remanded. double jeopardy protection does not bar the District Court
from reinstating the Jury's guilty verdict and sentencing the Defendant.

The Defendant agrees that if the District Court's Judgment of Acquittal is
reversed and remanded, double jeopardy protection does not bar the District Court
from reinstating the Jury's guilty verdict and sentencing the Defendant. State v.

Carmouche, _Idaho _ , _P.3d _,2013 WL 6153145 (Ct. App. 2013).
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3. Mr. Johnson could not be convicted of theft from Beaudry Motor
Sport, where the funds were from Beaudry Motor, Inc., and then became
the property of Edge Performance, Inc.

It is axiomatic that Mr. Johnson cannot be tried and convicted of a crime for

which he was not charged. Mr. Johnson did not take unauthorized control over that
check from Beaudry Motor, Inc. That check was made unconditionally payable to the
order of Edge Performance, Inc. and delivered to Edge Performance, Inc. At that
point, the check became the property of Edge Performance, and the funds became
payable to Edge Performance. As the agent for Edge Performance, Mr. Johnson
deposited the check into the Edge Performance checking account. Even if those funds
were used by Mr. Johnson to pay for something other than appropriate business
expenses of Edge Performance, those funds belonged to Edge Performance. Mr.
Johnson was charged with taking unauthorized possession or control over funds
belonging to Beaudry Motor Sports. He was not charged with taking unauthorized
possession or control over funds belonging to Edge Performance.
Furthermore, for the sake of the argument propounded by the State that some
elements of ownership of the funds were not transferred to Edge Performance, those
remaining elements belonged to the transferor, Beaudry Motor, Inc., not Beaudry
Motor Sports. Mr. Johnson was charged with taking unauthorized control over funds
belonging to Beaudry Motor Sports. As the check was drawn on the account of
21

Beaudry Motor, Inc., the residual rights to those funds, if they existed, would have
had to belong to Beaudry Motor, Inc., and Mr. Johnson's unauthorized control over
those funds would have been over funds belonging to Beaudry Motor, Inc. rather than
Beaudry Motor Sports. Again, it is axiomatic that Mr. Johnson could not be found
guilty of a crime for which he had not been charged.

4. Mr. Johnson cannot be found guilty for non-performance of a
contractual obligation, because the Idaho Constitution forbids
imprisonment for debt.

Article I, Section 15 of the Idaho Constitution provides that: "There shall be no
imprisonment for debt in this state except in cases of fraud." "The constitutional
prohibition for debt relates to matters basically contractual in nature." Phillips v.

District Court of the Fifth Judicial Dist., 95 Idaho 404, 406, 509 P.2d 1325,1327
(1973). "Moreover, if [I.C. §18-2403(1)] were interpreted to include mere
nonpayment of debt, it would likely run afoul of Article I, section 15 of the Idaho
Constitution, which specifies that "[t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt in this
state except in cases of fraud." State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho at 326,193 P.3d at 873.
As argued above, the relationship between Beaudry Motor, Inc. and Edge
Performance was contractual. They entered into a unilateral contract which was
arguably breached. Even if Mr. Johnson could be found liable for the breach of
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contract, this provision of the Idaho Constitution would preclude criminal liability for
that breach.

CONCLUSION

Beaudry Motor, Inc. unconditionally gave the check and the funds to Edge
Performance. Therefore, Mr. Johnson, as the president of Edge Performance, cannot
have exercised unauthorized control over those funds. As those funds became the
unconditional property of Edge Performance, no rights in those funds were retained
by Beaudry Motor, Inc. Therefore, neither Edge Performance, nor Mr. Johnson,
could be the bailee of those funds, and could not exercise unauthorized control over
those funds. The entry of the Judgment of Acquittal was proper, and should not be
reversed.
As Beaudry Motor, Inc., and not Beaudry Motor Sports, gave the funds to Edge
Performance, and not to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson could not be found guilty of
unauthorized possession or unauthorized control of funds belonging to Beaudry
Motor Sports. The entry of the Judgment of Acquittal was proper, and should not be
reversed.
1. C. § 18, 2403(3) cannot make a breach of contract a crime. To do so would
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violate Article I, section 15 of the Idaho Constitution, which specifies that there shall
be no imprisonment for debt in this state except in cases of fraud. The entry of the

Judgment of Acquittal was proper, and should not be reversed.
If the Judgment of Acquittal is reversed and remanded, double jeopardy does
not bar the reinstatement of the jury's guilty verdict and the sentencing of Mr.
Johnson.
Dated January 21,2014.

MALCOLM DYMKOSKI
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